

peoples are an indelible part of our history, institutionalized cruelty against the weak and defenseless is as American as apple pie" (231). Certainly one would agree with this statement given enslavement, labor abuses, ethnic and gender disenfranchisement, and exterminatory westward expansion. Connecting these abuses with animals, however, takes some work. To satisfy this burden, Patterson details the diachronic path of "animal," and illumines how the term has been used to denigrate both lower species and "savages," or so-called lower classes, races, and ethnicities of humans.

Chapters one and two examine the 11,000 year tradition of domesticating animals, and how humans have vilified "others" as animals in the same tradition. Patterson performs a phenomenal task by classifying the ways in which Western culture has metonymically reduced non-white others to animal status. Starting with African populations, he discusses how white explorers like Sir Charles Lyell, while traversing the "dark continent," would log in his journal such epithets as, "The brain of the bushmen leads towards the brain of the Simian" (29). Patterson's argument that slavery hinged on such animal metonyms gains support from imperial narratives from the East India Company, European physicians, and American anatomists, plantation owners, and eugenicists. Regarding American Indians, Patterson points to classic racists such as Hugh Brackenridge and Andrew Jackson to illustrate the power of the animal metonym in colonizing, "caging" (as savages) on reservations, and "exterminating" (as pests) native populations. Even jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes and editor L. Frank Baum are seen as propagating the animal-as-justification discourse. Holmes exhorts whites to "hunt him [the Indian] down like the wild beasts of the forest . . . so that the red crayon sketch is rubbed out, and the canvas is ready for a picture of manhood a little more like God's own image" (35). In this case, the American Indian is reduced first to an animal, and then to an object of utility—a "crayon."

The foregoing data has been publicized. What makes Patterson's attack on frontier rhetoric unique is its extension to the Spanish-American War, the Philippine invasion, World War Two, Red China, Vietnam, and even Iraq. Consider Major General Adna Chaffee's 1899 comments about Philippino rebels: "we killed them like rabbits . . . no cruelty is too severe for these brainless monkeys . . . (they) are a miserable-looking lot of little brown rats" (39). Such sentiments carried into the 20<sup>th</sup> century. John Dower describes the Japanese during World War Two as "animals, reptiles, or insects, monkeys, baboons, gorillas, dogs, mice and rats, vipers and rattlesnakes, cockroaches, vermin—or, more indirectly, 'the Japanese herd'" (39). Patterson details the continuation of this process; the Red Chinese as "chink dogs," the Viet Cong as "termites," and the Iraqis as "cockroaches of the desert" provide a fresh look at how the United States has vilified the "other" by way of the "animal" label.

Chapter three develops a controversial discussion of Jewish denigration at the hands of the Nazis. Patterson posits that U. S. destruction of Africans and American Indians provided a template for Hitler to follow. Moreover, he contends that the U. S. business of factory farming (in the vein of Sinclair's report in *The Jungle*) afforded the Third Reich a system of gathering, feeding, and expeditious slaughter. Regarding the former, evidence exists that Hitler lauded America's genocidal solution to the alleged "Indian" problem. To link animal slaughterhouses with human concentration camps, however, evokes debate. The connection Patterson makes places animals and European Jewry in the same class. By comparing industries, he compares the victims of the industries. Thus, to admit Patterson's point, we group Jewish and animal victims together; this move raises issues of inconsistency vis-à-vis the brutal criticism of Western culture found in chapters one and two.

Despite this controversial homology, Patterson does a service to Holocaust studies and rhetorical approaches to animal rights. That is, he illustrates the reduction of Jews to animals and demonstrates the importance of animal rights to human rights. If factory farms—not to mention fur ranches, clothing mills, breeding barns, and animal entertainment facilities—represent the 21<sup>st</sup> century's concentration camps, then we should work to eradicate the evil to prevent more murders. This review neither supports nor rejects Patterson's argument; it respects the argument for its contribution to homological studies, movement criticism, and ideographic analysis. *Eternal Treblinka* offers much to scholars interested in cultural studies, social movements, Holocaust studies, cultural memory, and rhetorical homology.

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DUMBSTRUCK: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF VENTRILOQUISM. By Steven Connor. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000; pp. 458. \$35.00.

It is often said that Herbert Wicheln's 1925 essay, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," provides the rationale for the discipline of speech communication. This justification distinguishes the criticism of oratory,

which is concerned with the adaptation of speech to audiences and its relative successes or failures, from that of literary criticism, which is concerned with aesthetics, truth, and the resonance that literary expressions of the human condition have among readers. What is sometimes forgotten, however, is the underlying warrant for such a distinction. Although he conceded that the art of the oratory was waning, Wichelns insisted that “human nature being what it is, there is no likelihood that face to face persuasion will cease to be a principal mode of exerting influence.” In other words, the physical act of speaking and utterance is the native precondition of suasive assent, whether or not the rhetorical text is a speech or essay. Historically, then, speech communication has been *ontologically* committed to the primacy of speech in distinction from a literary commitment to the written word.

Notwithstanding Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence implicated in maintaining the primacy of speech (“logocentrism”), there has been some reluctance to jettison speech as—in the words of Susan Langer—the unmistakable, audible “mark of humanity.” Although many *Quarterly Journal of Speech* subscribers have witnessed the disappearance of “speech” from departmental nameplates, the *QJS* editorial board has held onto its roots in the titular concept. “Speech” is titular, of course, in a double sense. In one ear, we hear rhetorical scholars insisting that our history in the criticism of speech and speaking provides disciplinary coherence for the variety of objects communication scholars study. In the other ear, one hears other scholars whispering that term appears on the journal “in title only” as a charming, nostalgic reminder of those formative years reflected in Wichelns’s essay. Outside of recent work exploring the rhetorical implications of the ethical and metaphysical theories of Emmanuel Levinas and similar dialogic theories of communication, however, discussion about the ontological bias harbored by the term “speech” has been muffled.

In his erudite study of the disembodied voice, *Dumbstruck: A Cultural History of Ventriloquism*, Steven Connor makes a case for investigating the phenomenological and psychological conditions of speech, speaking, and voice. Defining ventriloquism as the sourceless, dissociated, or displaced voice, Connor moves from analyses of the Delphic Oracle and biblical witchcraft (chapters two and three), to demonic possession and glossolalia (chapters four through six), to divine speech and prophecy (chapters seven through ten), and, finally, to ventriloquism as a form of entertainment with dummies (chapters eleven through eighteen). Connor investigates the relations between bodies and voices, the significance of voice in the formation of subjectivity, and the relationships between voice, power, and authority. Throughout the book Connor avoids any particular, sustained argument because reactions to, and understandings of, the voice have changed dramatically over time in a manner that resists any easy historical arc. Instead, the author investigates the critical object of voice genealogically and thematically. Although the voice is Connor’s primary object, it is investigated by examining the kinds of voices that provoke what Freud termed “the uncanny effect” and what Connor calls the “ventriloquial voice.” Examining the ventriloquial voice is productive because, just as Freud’s study of hysterics told him something of the paradigm psyche, so, too, the disassociated voice tells us something about the voice as such. Further, reactions and discussions about the strange or disembodied voice are more conspicuous than the embodied voice in extant texts.

Focusing on the ventriloquial voice helps Connor formulate intriguing questions specific to historical moments: How does an examination of the oracular voice of antiquity disclose anxieties about the female body? What does the exorcism of a “bad” or “demonic” voice tell us about religious authority? How does the Enlightenment debate over the miraculous voice disclose the emergence of new regimes of power-knowledge? What does our fear of talking dummies and dolls, a popular theme in horror films, tell us about the relationship of voices and bodies in contemporary society?

Readers expecting pat answers to these and similar questions will be disappointed (perhaps dumbstruck), however, because Connor is an uncompromising dialectician. For example, Connor argues that the Spiritualistic practice of channeling voices from the astral realm (“the direct voice”) common in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is an attempt to resist the separation of voice and body effected by modern teletchnologies like the gramophone and telephone as well as an attempt to reify the voice as a divine, disembodied presence (392–93). Connor’s comfort with this kind of ambivalence is related to his theoretical orientation, which is announced in the introduction as a phenomenological methodology rooted in a psychoanalytic theory of subjectivity—two modes of thought that do not recommend one another.

In the spirit of the body-focused phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Connor suggests that “my voice defines me because it draws me into coincidence with myself. . . . And yet my voice is also most essentially itself and my own in the ways in which it parts or passes from me” (7). The voice, Merleau-Ponty insists, “is the subject’s taking up of a position in the world of his meanings.” Yet the uncomfortable feeling of hearing one’s own voice on an answering machine suggests an interior, unconscious dimension of subjectivity as well: “In speaking,” says Connor, “we listen intently to our own speaking voice. . . . we eavesdrop on our own speech, but do not, as it were, hear ourselves listening.” When confronted by our own

voices from without, we wince because we recognize on some unconscious or preconscious level that we “might betray . . . what we do not mean to say—or mean not to say” in our speech (8). In waking life, suggests Connor, we conceal the self-monitoring of our speech from ourselves; hearing our recorded voices, we are rent from the masturbatory cathexis of self-speech and made to confront parts of the self we have ignored. “People who hear their own recorded voices do not find them merely unfamiliar; they usually also find them alien—ugly, piping, thin, crude, drawling, barking, or otherwise unattractive” (9).

Having articulated our reaction to our own voices as the return of the repressed, Connor describes the object of repression as the “bad voice.” In our cries of hunger as babies, we associate a “bad voice” with the embodied self as a “painfully empty mouth,” and a “good voice” with the mother who appears with the breast. When cries for hunger go unheeded, hallucinations of miraculously appearing breasts (Lacan’s *objet [petit] a*) and their attendant, soothing voice lead to frustration and disappointment. “The child attempts to feed itself with its voice,” says Connor, “but its voice simply crams starvation back down its throat.” Consequently, an angry voice emerges as a self-destructive speech of violence. As we grow older, we begin to associate our own voice with the “good voice,” and repress the bad, angry, hungry voice as “the self become other.” Mapped onto the production of bodies, the bad voice is associated with the excremental and profane. The good voice is our own voice, the voice of creation and self-love (narcissism).

Although this psychological theory of the “good voice” and “bad voice,” and their interplay of interiors and exteriors, is echoed throughout Connor’s study, his original commitment to a phenomenology of surfaces or exteriors exists in terms of method (namely, the technique of *epoche*, a style of thought that attempts to bracket cultural assumptions and approach objects in terms of their subjectively experienced meaning in particular contexts). Even so, it is not necessary to embrace Connor’s vocalic subjectivity to understand the utility of the good voice/bad voice model. Oracular and prophetic speech is denounced by its detractors as “demonic” and associated with the bad voice, while believers understand prophecy as divine speech. In the heyday of church-sponsored exorcism (a practice currently on the rise in the United States), possession was characterized as a war between voices over the body; demonic speech was analogous to vomiting, flatulence, and defecation, while the oppressed voice within is the speech of goodness and faith, associated with creation and birth (155). The more contemporary, entertaining ventriloquist voice, associated with dummies who refuse to behave, again, features the contest of good versus bad speech; loosed from a dialogue with the controlling, exterior good voice of the ventriloquist, dummies can symbolize the “split-off bad voice” that threatens to kill us. The murderous exploits of the knife-wielding Chucky doll in the film *Child’s Play* and its many sequels come to mind.

The dialectical ambivalence central to the book’s construction is its genius and weakness. Connor admits that the ventriloquist idiom, like every generative vocabulary of its scope, is “nerve-wrackingly large” and, in return, has helped to produce a very long, four hundred and forty-nine page book that is frequently tiresome. In a number of the chapters in which theory is pushed to the background, the “culture” from the titular “cultural history” drops out of consideration and, consequently, discussions lack focus, resembling a plodding historical antiquarianism. Nevertheless, this minor inconvenience is eclipsed by the book’s chief accomplishment. *Dumbstruck* demonstrates the importance of understanding the power of speech, the role voices play in the construction and care of Self, and the ways in which a criticism of the extant reactions to the quality and use of a voice, embodied or not, can tell us something about authority and power.

In the now widely acknowledged movement of the locus of the public’s business from the forum to the screen, Connor’s suggestion that the voice is central to the conduct of everyday life amplifies Wicheln’s increasingly distant missive in a fresh way. Rhetorical scholars interested in the elocutionists, for example, will find Connor’s discussion of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century obsession with vocal hygiene and the explosion of texts devoted to the creation of a strong and healthy voice suggestive of a kind of rhetorical neurosis—particularly in terms of classed bodies (327–37). Scholars of the prophetic tradition will find Connor’s suggestion that prophets used the body itself as an argument for the authority of voice in keeping with the appeal to self-evidence and enactment typical of prophetic rhetoric. He reminds us that “the Quakers, the Convulsionaries, and the Shakers were characterized by fits of uncontrollable movement” in preparation for “the surrender of the body to the power of the Holy Spirit,” the super-duper good voice, “which also results in ecstatic cries, shrieks, groans, and ejaculations.” The erotics of prophecy concern a “preparatory loosening of the restraints normally at work in the body, to permit the eventual release of divine speech” (187–88). Prophecy is an exorcism of the good voice, a bodily excretion of the divine, which results in the creation and purity of speech; an exorcism of the bad voice rids the body of filth and the detritus of guilt and sin. In light of the vocalic body, or our tendency to fashion bodies for voices (e. g., we tend to create mental faces for radio announcers, for example), rhetoricians interested in the body as a discursive phenomenon may find Connor’s ventriloquist idiom useful.

I recommend Connor's *Dumbstruck* because it returns speech to communication, and communication to bodies in intercourse within a lived space—in the “life-world” to wax phenomenological. John Durham Peters may be right that for centuries we have been doing nothing but “speaking into the air” in pursuit of an impossible melding of minds in respect to the concept of communication. Yet as Connor would remind us, where there is speech, there is the production of self. And in the production of self, in the staging of voice-as-speaking, there must also be the non-self, the Other, the “foreigner,” or “babbling barbarian.” One soon recognizes in her own speech that “the foreign body is . . . one possessed of a familiar spirit.” Hence, the “unpronounceable, unrenounceable foreign word for a foreign body in the body [*ventrioloqua*] will keep coming and going as our . . . most intimate familiar” (417).

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**SPEAKING TO THE PEOPLE: THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.**

Edited By Richard J. Ellis. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998; pp. vii + 144. Paper \$16.95.

Richard J. Ellis reveals in the acknowledgments that this volume grew out of a series of papers originally presented at the 1995 Western Political Science Association. The true origin of this book, however, is the rediscovery by political scientists of the concept of the “rhetorical presidency” presented by Jeffrey Tulis in 1987. Tulis contributes the concluding chapter to this intriguing collection of nine essays. As a clearly structured anthology, this book promises at the outset to provide valuable insight on the historical evolution of presidential rhetoric. Taken as a whole, however, the volume is not completely satisfying.

Ellis begins the book with a lengthy introduction that previews in detail the nine subsequent essays. He asserts that the collective purpose of the volume is to “recover and reclaim alternative understandings of democratic leadership” (15). Given this ambiguous thesis and the fact that a book is not an academic convention and readers possess easy access to all nine essays, this opening seems superfluous. Ellis also includes one of his own essays in the book (chapter five) as well as a co-authored piece (chapter two).

The first two chapters in the volume, “A Marriage Made in Philadelphia: The Constitution and the Rhetorical Presidency,” and “Jefferson, Jackson, and the Origins of the Presidential Mandate,” offer well-research historical narratives, but little in the way of critical or theoretical insight on the rhetoric of these periods. The authors of these respective chapters, David Nichols (chapter one), Richard Ellis and Stephen Kirk (chapter two) rehash much of the already known tale of the evolution of the presidency embodied in the creation of the executive branch and the actions of Jefferson and Jackson. It should be noted, however, that Ellis and Kirk admirably trace Andrew Jackson’s rhetorical strategy leading up to his veto message on the Bank of the United States in 1831. Their analysis ends abruptly with a lamentation on the role these symbolic presidential mandates played in the eventual decline of political parties. This argument is not well developed, nor does it consider the role the mass media played in the continuing decline of twentieth-century political party structures.

Chapter three, “The Presidential Newspapers: The Forgotten Way of Going Public,” by Mel Larcey delivers what is promised in the title. Readers learn of the origins of presidential newspapers in the early rhetorical battles between Hamilton and Jefferson. Next, the “Golden Age” (1828–1850) of presidential newspapers is chronicled. Finally, the legacies of these publications are summarized, with special emphasis on Abraham Lincoln’s use of newspapers. Although this chapter is much too brief, it effectively directs attention to a largely forgotten method by which nineteenth-century presidents actively sought to influence public opinion. This chapter is, in fact, the only one in the anthology that includes a serious consideration of the role played by the mass media in the eventual rise of the rhetorical presidency. A serious shortcoming of the book as a whole is that most authors fail to acknowledge how presidents have always used the available means of mass communication to influence public opinion.

Of the next five chapters in the volume, only Richard Ellis’s critique of nomination acceptance addresses (five) and Daniel Stid’s assessment of Woodrow Wilson’s “Rhetorical Leadership” (seven) should interest rhetoricians. Ellis presents a careful analysis of acceptance speeches by “great” and “near-great” presidents. Although his case studies reflect thoughtful research, his critical insight would have benefited from a study of generic criticism. Stid’s chapter deepens our understanding of Wilson’s rhetorical philosophy, from his academic publications through his early presidential speeches. Chapter four by Gerald Gamm and Renee Smith is an uninspired empirical analysis of presidential speechmaking and party interaction between 1877 and 1929. Terri Bimes and Stephen Skowronek’s chapter six offers a mundane reassessment of Woodrow Wilson’s changing perceptions of popular readership as revealed in the various revisions of his college

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